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SYMPOSIUM
KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
STAYING AFLOAT AND ENGAGED IN TODAY’S
FLOODED MARKETPLACE OF SPEECH
Michael Y. Scudder*
Thank you for the kind introduction and invitation to give this address
and participate in the Symposium. It is a special privilege for me to come to
Notre Dame. I grew up in Indiana, about ninety miles from here in Fort
Wayne, have always admired the University, and know several members of the
Law School’s faculty, including, of course, Judge Amy Coney Barrett, my wonderful colleague on the Seventh Circuit. I don’t know whether Rick Garnett
or Bill Kelley get the credit or the blame for inviting me. Both are friends,
and I appreciate this opportunity very much.
I am honored to give this Address in the Patrick McCartan Courtroom.
Mr. McCartan, the former managing partner of Jones Day and chairman of
the University’s Board of Trustees, is one of the finest, classiest individuals I
have ever met and worked for.
I.
We gather on this picturesque campus in the heart of the fall in Indiana.
All around us are Hoosier farms, small towns, and diner discussions about
the latest happenings—reminders in many ways not just of yesteryears, but
also of who we want to remain and be as a people—communities stitched
together around shared values, bonded by a love of family and friends, and
an embrace of hard, hands-on work. So, too, though do we come together in
the age of smartphones, social media, e-commerce, and news cycles that seem
to run twenty-five hours a day, eight days a week.
This is America today—a world where many aspects of the way we think,
communicate, and interact have one foot still touching yesterday and
© 2019 Michael Y. Scudder. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Address in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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another trying to find balance today. So today’s Symposium comes at a most
opportune time and covers a most important topic—Contemporary Free Speech:
The Marketplace of Ideas a Century Later.
The Symposium takes its title from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States.1 The Supreme Court decided
Abrams in 1919, and the case presented the question whether Russian émigrés
violated the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging a workers’
revolution and disparaging America’s involvement in World War I.2 The
Court upheld the convictions, concluding that the messages conveyed in the
leaflets, intended as they were to provoke resistance against the American
military campaign in Europe and to urge labor strikes in ammunition factories critical to the war effort, enjoyed no First Amendment protection.3
Justice Holmes dissented, arguing against the regulation of dissident
speech, reasoning, in the words that gather us today, that “the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”4 The point, of course, is that we best find truth when speech competes with speech, with government handcuffed from putting its thumb on
the side of particular messages.
What a difference a century makes. Leafletting has been replaced by
Twitter and Facebook; and the public forum is no longer the town square but
rather a vast digital landscape without boundaries. The free trade in ideas,
once measured through the quality of finite speech, is now tested by a tsunami of speech.
With Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams as the starting point, the Law
Review has brought together a distinguished group of professors to offer ideas
on how the conception of the marketplace of ideas applies, if at all, to many
of today’s most pressing and unanswered challenges, including contentious
political discourse, hostile counterspeech, and digital privacy. Each professor
has drafted an article and provided a valuable contribution.
Dawn Nunziato of George Washington University and Alexander Tsesis
of Loyola Chicago tackle the digital issues head-on, proposing new ways to
address the complex balance between speech and privacy, truth and untruth,
in the social media era. Professor Nunziato describes current regulatory
approaches to these challenges at home and abroad, recommending new legislation to limit future foreign intervention in American elections and to
increase the transparency of online political advertisements. For his part,
Professor Tsesis argues that consumer protection considerations should play
a prominent role in the Congress’s and judiciary’s balancing of speech and
digital privacy.
John Inazu of Washington University in St. Louis analyzes today’s political contentiousness through the lens of Justice Holmes’s discussion of the
1
2
3
4

250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 616–17.
See id. at 624.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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certainty of conviction relative to speech and its impact on the marketplace
of ideas. Professor Inazu argues that society benefits when a humble
approach to personal beliefs guides individual contributions to national discourse. Likewise, Leslie Kendrick from the University of Virginia assesses the
tension between the Abrams-style marketplace of ideas and the “clear and
present danger” test, introduced by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States.5
Reflecting on the contributions of Professors Inazu and Kendrick, Fred
Schauer, also from the University of Virginia, examines the history of
counterspeech—from the planned Skokie Nazi march in 1977 to today’s
clashes on college campuses. Professor Schauer finds today’s legal
frameworks underdeveloped to address fully instances where speech in its
own right is used to drown out a controversial primary speaker. He offers
thoughtful observations on what truly constitutes interference with speech,
arguing that difficulties in defining that interference have hindered efforts to
establish when counterspeech goes too far.
Finally, the Symposium benefits from broader discussions of the legal
frameworks applied to assess the First Amendment in contemporary settings.
Heidi Kitrosser from the University of Minnesota addresses the balance
between statutorily provided speech mechanisms like whistleblower laws and
Supreme Court precedent holding that the First Amendment provides no
protections for government officials speaking pursuant to their official
duties.6 Mary-Rose Papandrea examines the Court’s shift away from its usual
speech rubrics when assessing public school students, public employees, and
the government speech doctrine, concluding that the Court’s resort to balancing tests in these areas comes with real costs. Finally, my former professor, Martin Redish from Northwestern University, assesses the complexities
associated with compelled commercial speech, suggesting a new standard for
measuring the legitimacy of government action in that domain.
II.
So the contributions to the Symposium cover substantial ground,
address important issues, and offer much to react to. This Symposium, I submit, also occurs at a time of significance for the First Amendment in the
Supreme Court. Perhaps the Court’s most fervent and consequential
defender of free speech, Justice Anthony Kennedy, has retired. His impact
on American constitutional law was enormous, including, in my view, in the
area of free speech. I had the privilege of clerking for Justice Kennedy,
admire him deeply as judge and person, and want to offer some reflections
on what I see as a few of Justice Kennedy’s more important contributions to
the law of free speech and what lessons those contributions may provide as
the law marches forward.
Across thirty years on the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy advanced
consistent, coherent, and impassioned defenses of the value of free speech.
5
6

249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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His opinions reflect an unwavering belief that the freedom of speech is essential to our autonomy and identity as individuals and to the preservation and
advancement of our republican form of government.
Allow me to illustrate these points by highlighting what I see as some of
Justice Kennedy’s most significant free speech opinions. At nearly every turn,
and with few exceptions, it is easy to see his agreement with Justice Holmes’s
conception of the First Amendment as protecting the marketplace of ideas.
Justice Kennedy joined the Supreme Court in February 1988, and a year
later the Court decided Texas v. Johnson,7 holding unconstitutional the Texas
statute that made it a crime for Gregory Lee Johnson to burn an American
flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas. Justice Kennedy joined the majority and penned a short concurring opinion foretelling
his strong commitment to free speech. He saw the case as “exact[ing] its
personal toll” and proving that “sometimes [courts] must make decisions we
do not like,” for he understood that “the flag holds a lonely place of honor in
an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple truths are burdened by
unneeded apologetics.”8 “It is poignant but fundamental,” Justice Kennedy
continued, “that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.”9 I have
little doubt he felt the same way twenty-two years later when he joined the
majority opinion in Snyder v. Phelps,10 where the Court protected outrageously offensive antigay protests by members of the Westboro Baptist
Church at the funeral of a fallen American soldier.11
One day after issuing its opinion in Texas v. Johnson, the Court decided
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,12 which presented a First Amendment challenge
to guidelines New York City had established to control the volume and sound
mix during concerts in Central Park.13 Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion and established the framework that remains to this day for evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum. He
emphasized the necessity of any such restrictions not only being content neutral, but also “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”14 Content neutrality, Justice Kennedy explained, meant that the First
Amendment prevented government from regulating speech in ways that
reflected disagreement with the message being conveyed15—a view he held
with unyielding and passionate conviction over his thirty years on the Court.
Three years into his tenure on the Court, Justice Kennedy took the first
of his many steps to emphasize that First Amendment doctrine must adapt to
changing times to protect speech. He made the point clear in his separate
7 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
8 Id. at 420–21 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 421.
10 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
11 Id. at 461.
12 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
13 Id. at 789.
14 Id. at 791.
15 See id.
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opinion in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,16 urging
that the public congregating areas in the New York City airports should be
treated as public fora—much like a street, sidewalk, or public park—and thus
broadly open to speech, including protests.17 It was the judiciary’s responsibility, Justice Kennedy reasoned, to determine whether a particular space
constituted a public forum, and those determinations needed to account for
“fast-changing technology and increasing insularity”—all in the interest of
promoting expressive activity.18
This same reasoning guided two important opinions Justice Kennedy
wrote for the Court in the context of speech in higher education, Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,19 and Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.20 In Rosenberger, the Court held that a
public university violated the First Amendment by withholding student activity fees from Wide Awake Productions, a Christian student organization that
published a Christian newspaper.21 The Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy’s opinion explained, did not require the University of Virginia to chart
this course, and the Free Speech Clause affirmatively prohibited it. Breaking
new doctrinal ground, he emphasized that the proper way to view the University’s pool of student activity fees was as a “metaphysical” forum designed to
create a marketplace for the free and robust exchange of ideas between and
among student groups of all viewpoints.22 To withhold funding on the basis
of the Christian students’ viewpoint reflected a most impermissible form of
speech regulation that risked, as Justice Kennedy put it, the “suppression of
free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s
intellectual life, its college and university campuses.”23
Southworth presented a question unresolved by Rosenberger: whether a
public university may require a student to pay an activity fee that supports the
objectionable speech of particular student groups. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy answered yes, emphasizing the substantial interest the University of Wisconsin had in using student fees to establish a nontraditional
forum to “facilitat[e] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its
students.”24 And returning to the principle of viewpoint neutrality at the
heart of Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy explained that so long as the student
fees are not being used to “prefer some viewpoints to others,” the First
Amendment permits the University to require the fee.25
16 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
17 Id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 697.
19 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
20 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
21 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826–27, 837.
22 See id. at 830–31.
23 Id. at 836.
24 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
25 Id. at 233.
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Perhaps above all else, Rosenberger and Southworth underscore Justice
Kennedy’s view of the importance of free and open speech in the university
setting. The opinions root themselves in the belief that exposure to the marketplace of ideas—Justice Holmes’s insight in Abrams—facilitates learning,
fosters critical thinking, and produces informed citizens and future leaders.
All of this goes a long way, in my judgment, to explaining Justice Kennedy’s
votes in the Court’s affirmative action cases, Grutter v. Bollinger26 in 2003 and
then more recently in his 2013 opinion for the Court in Fisher v. University of
Texas.27 Those cases rest in no small part on the view that exposure in the
university setting to diversity in all of its forms yields important and lasting
educational benefits.
I believe this same institutional interest—a state’s promotion of higher
education and its many benefits—likely explains Justice Kennedy’s vote and
separate concurring opinion in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,28 a case
arguably standing as an outlier in his free speech jurisprudence. The Court
there rejected a free speech challenge to the so-called all-comers policy of the
Hastings College of Law. The policy conditioned the recognition of student
groups and their ability to use school funds and facilities on each group’s
agreement to open their membership to all students, without regard to ideology. The Court held that the all-comers policy was viewpoint neutral, as it
applied across the board to all student groups of all ideologies, and reflected
a reasonable way for a public institution, as part of creating a limited and
special purpose forum, to enhance the learning environment for all students
to choose to distribute benefits.29 Justice Kennedy wrote separately to
emphasize not just that viewpoint neutrality saved the all-comers policy but
also that Hastings designed the policy to help its students realize the educational benefits of diversity—a point he made by citing and quoting Justice
Powell’s separate opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.30
So, while Christian Legal Society may seem like an instance where Justice
Kennedy endorsed a form of forced association at odds with Rosenberger and,
more generally, his belief in the importance of individual autonomy and selfexpression, another interpretation is possible. Christian Legal Society may
have reflected Justice Kennedy’s willingness to recognize—at least at the level
of a program’s facial design—the state’s institutional interest in advancing
objectives of higher education.
This same willingness to credit important institutional interests may
explain Justice Kennedy’s vote and majority opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos,31
where the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect a government employee from discipline based on statements made as part of the
26 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
27 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
28 561 U.S. 661, 703–06 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 694–95 (majority opinion).
30 Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 312 n.48 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
31 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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employee’s official responsibilities.32 And I think the same can be said of
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc.,33 where he was willing to afford the City of Los Angeles some latitude
with zoning regulations targeting the secondary effects of speech from adult
bookstores, massage parlors, and the like.34 In other words, the government’s institutional interests as employer and regulator of community health
and welfare carried the day in Garcetti and Alameda Books, just as the Hastings
Law School’s institutional interests seemed to save the all-comers policy in
Christian Legal Society.
Justice Kennedy’s insistence that the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint discrimination took center stage in his final writing as a member the
Supreme Court. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,35
the Court held that a California law requiring licensed health clinics to notify
women that the state provides free family planning services, including abortions, violated the First Amendment.36 While joining the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to express what he called “serious constitutional concern” with a law that required “pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the State’s own preferred message advertising abortions”—a
“paradigmatic example,” as he saw it, of viewpoint discrimination.37 He especially took the California legislature to task for declaring the law to further
the state’s legacy of what it called “forward thinking.”38 “It is forward thinking,” Justice Kennedy sternly retorted, “to begin by reading the First Amendment as ratified in 1791,” to understand the risks of the government acting to
stifle speech, and “to carry those lessons onward as we seek to preserve and
teach the necessity of freedom of speech for the generations to come.”39
The bottom line for Justice Kennedy was that “[g]overnments must not be
allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest
convictions.”40
One of Justice Kennedy’s most important opinions underscored this
same point and came in his dissent in Hill v. Colorado,41 where the Court
upheld a state statute that made it a crime for anyone within one hundred
feet of a “health care facility,” including an abortion clinic, to approach
another person without consent to engage in “oral protest, education, or
counseling.”42 Justice Kennedy reacted passionately to the majority’s reliance on what it termed the “unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
2008
39
40
41
42

Id. at 421.
535 U.S. 425, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
Id. at 2378.
Id. at 2378–79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2379 (quoting Joint Appendix at 39, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140),
WL 388836).
Id.
Id.
530 U.S. 703 (2000).
Id. at 707 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
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unwanted communication,” part of the broader “right to be let alone,” with
the majority borrowing from Justice Brandeis’s dissent seventy-two years earlier in Olmstead v. United States.43 To use Justice Kennedy’s words, “speech
makes a difference, as it must when acts of lasting significance and profound
moral consequence are being contemplated.”44 In this way—and indeed in
ways that may have surprised many—Justice Kennedy saw the majority opinion in Hill as a blow not just to the First Amendment, but also, as he underscored, to the “essential reasoning”45 of the Court’s plurality opinion in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,46 which he
coauthored. At the core of Casey, he observed, was the Court’s reaffirmation
of a woman’s right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy—a decision
that benefits from more speech, not less. So, as the Justice saw it, there was
“[n]o better illustration of the immediacy of speech, of the urgency of persuasion, of the preciousness of time” than presented by the Colorado law,
where, for the prohibited speech to be effective, it “must take place at the
very time and place” it may matter most.47 He viewed the majority opinion as
“strik[ing] at the heart of the reasoned, careful balance” he saw as “the basis
for the opinion in Casey.”48
So we come to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,49 the prime
candidate for Justice Kennedy’s most controversial free speech opinion. The
verdict on Citizens United is either triumph or tragedy, with few expressing
ambivalence about the outcome. The Court held unconstitutional a federal
prohibition on corporations spending their own funds to advocate for or
against candidates for political office. Emphasizing that “[s]peech is an
essential mechanism of democracy,” the “First Amendment ‘“has its fullest
and most urgent application” to speech uttered during a campaign for political office,’”50 and that the right of free speech extends to corporations, Justice Kennedy’s opinion reasoned that the government cannot remove a
speaker—here a corporation—from the market without interfering with the
“‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment.”51 Overruled, therefore, was Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,52 the Court’s
1990 decision upholding limits on corporate electioneering speech on the
basis of distorting and corrosive effects enabled by allowing the aggregation
of corporate wealth for or against a particular candidate. Citizens United, in
43 Id. at 716 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
44 Hill, 530 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 791.
46 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
47 Hill, 530 U.S. at 792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 791.
49 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
50 Id. at 339 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989)).
51 Id. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008)).
52 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
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short, rooted itself in Justice Kennedy’s consistent and unrelenting view that
the government should have little to no role in selecting what speech or
speaker to permit or favor. As he put it,
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal
law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what
distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control
thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to
think for ourselves.53

Justice Kennedy also made a mark in the area of commercial speech.
Writing for the Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,54 he condemned contentbased restrictions on commercial speech. The Court in Sorrell invalidated
limitations Vermont had placed on the sale and use for marketing purposes
of pharmacy records revealing individual physician’s prescribing practices.
These limitations, Justice Kennedy emphasized, were the product of the state
legislature allowing nearly everyone—insurers, researchers, journalists, and
even the state itself—except pharmaceutical manufacturers to acquire and
use the so-called prescriber-identifying information.55 This effected an
impermissible distortion of the marketplace for speech on issues of medical
safety and drug efficacy: “The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of
our social and cultural life,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “provides a forum where
ideas and information flourish,” and the “general rule is that the speaker and
the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented.”56
No discussion of Justice Kennedy’s free speech jurisprudence would be
complete without pausing on United States v. Alvarez.57 The Court in Alvarez
held unconstitutional—as an impermissible content-based regulation of
speech—the Stolen Valor Act.58 The statute made it a federal crime for Xavier Alvarez to claim at a meeting of his local water board that twenty years
earlier he had been awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor for his service
as a Marine. The statement was a lie, or, as Justice Kennedy bluntly put it, “a
pathetic attempt [by Alvarez] to gain respect that eluded him.”59 The
Court’s plurality opinion extended sweeping protections to false speech, reasoning that it is up to individuals—not the government—to sort truth from
falsity. “Our constitutional tradition,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the plurality,
“stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”60 “The
remedy for speech that is false,” he continued, “is speech that is true. This is
the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the
rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the sim53 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356.
54 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
55 Id. at 580.
56 Id. at 579 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
57 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion).
58 Id. at 715.
59 Id. at 714.
60 Id. at 723.
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ple truth.”61 Or, directly on point for this Symposium and quoting from Justice Holmes’s opinion in Abrams, Justice Kennedy reminded that “[t]he
theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”62
In Justice Kennedy’s final free speech majority opinion on the Court,
Packingham v. North Carolina,63 the Court declared unconstitutional a state
law that made it a felony for Lester Gerard Packingham, a registered sex
offender, to post to his personal page on Facebook a message saying “God is
Good” after a traffic court dismissed a ticket.64 While this looks like pretty
innocent speech, the state law said otherwise, and indeed called what Mr.
Packingham did a crime because of the simple fact that he knew that minors
also used Facebook. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that
the law lacked narrow tailoring, as it all but foreclosed internet access to registered sex offenders.65 In doing so, he returned to the observations he
made twenty-five years earlier in the Krishna Consciousness case about the
necessity to adapt free speech doctrine to changing times.66 Justice Kennedy
described social media sites as the modern public forum used by millions of
people to “engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on
topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’”67 He then projected broad protection
for speech in cyberspace, observing that, “[w]hile we now may be coming to
the realization that the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we
cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we
think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be.”68
Only time will tell Justice Kennedy’s impact on American constitutional
law. If I had to offer an early nomination, I believe his contributions to the
law of free speech will prove lasting and consequential. His opinions reflect
an abiding commitment to the belief that the First Amendment’s promise of
free speech is essential to individual freedom—to grow in knowledge and
wisdom, to define our autonomy and identity, to chart our course forward in
life, and to participate fully in our democracy.
Justice Kennedy’s opinions expressed reverence for this freedom, seeing
it as the Constitution’s North Star. His opinions, by design I would submit,
describe the value and virtue of speech in lofty, idealistic, aspirational, and
optimistic terms to push each of us to reach our full potential as individuals
and citizens. Time and again the opinions see the First Amendment as both
inviting active and high-minded individual engagement and promising that
61 Id. at 727.
62 Id. at 728 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
63 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
64 Id. at 1734–35 (quoting Joint Appendix at 136, Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (No. 151194), 2016 WL 7321395).
65 Id. at 1737.
66 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
67 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870
(1997)).
68 Id. at 1736.
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the government must stand back and not pick sides. That indeed is the
essence of free speech: these choices belong to us to make as individuals, not
the government, and our hardest challenges as individuals and a nation benefit from more thought and more speech, even if the price is that we encounter some deplorable messages along the way.
I trust that many of Justice Kennedy’s opinions will remain mainstays in
First Amendment casebooks, and for these contributions we owe him a debt
of gratitude.
III.
Allow me in closing to offer a few of my own reflections on where we
find ourselves today.
Foremost, the marketplace seems overcrowded, with too many voices,
too much news, and too many messages competing for our attention. Our
shopping carts, in other words, feel overloaded and the market too big,
flooded, and open too many hours each day, leaving us not sure how to participate, and overwhelmed by the modern challenge of finding quiet and
time to think, much less becoming informed about issues that matter.
Feeling overwhelmed often paralyzes and instills cynicism, if not fear.
Not sure what to do, many stand still, choosing the sidelines over the playing
field, finding it much easier, if frustrating, to sit out than to participate, not
knowing what play to call or how to engage. The size, speed, and saturation
of today’s marketplace—the overwhelming ubiquity of speech—chills participation, leaving us unsure of how our own voice can make a difference.
I worry equally so, if not more so, about today’s marketplace lacking
civility. Our discourse too often has sharp edges, a bluntness and crassness
unbecoming our tradition, more committed to slinging arrows than to listening, learning, empathizing, and searching for common ground. All of this is
abetted at some level by our twenty-four seven news cycles and the information overload and anonymity of the cyber age. We feel pressed to communicate nonstop but without much substance, too often finding it too easy to
react instantly, to spray criticism and insult, to say something in an email,
text, post, or tweet that we would never say in person. We are losing our
ability to step back.
So where do we go from here? The wrong reaction is to hang our heads,
live for yesterday, and somehow convince ourselves that 1791 was forever ago
and that the First Amendment America once knew is itself drowning in
today’s flooded marketplace. Or, worse yet, it would be dead wrong and
indeed dangerous to blame the flood and poor quality of our discourse on
the First Amendment. And, more than anything, nobody should look to
trade today’s cyber age—the promise and extraordinary opportunity it
offers—for a quill pen.
The right reaction, I believe, is to double down on our commitment to
free speech. The First Amendment is alive and well, fully capable of applying
in today’s marketplace, and we best prove that by embracing its promise at an
individual level and through our individual example. Don’t make the mis-
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take of trying to calm the whole sea or, as my grandfather used to say, to boil
the ocean.
Before introducing the marketplace of ideas, Justice Holmes in Abrams
offered an observation worth underscoring: “If you have no doubt of your
premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”69 “I
think that we should be eternally vigilant,” he continued, “against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death . . . .”70
Justice Holmes’s message rings as clear and pertinent today and as it did
in 1919: neither we as individuals nor the government should foreclose
speech based on our opposition to or disagreement with particular messages.
The right response is to embrace the freedom the First Amendment provides
to chart our own individual courses and to persuade others that our path,
our idea, and our perspective is both right and worth following.
The answer and path forward, then, lies in our individual responses to
the First Amendment’s invitation to engage. We do that best when we
choose the playing field over the sidelines and communicate and interact in
ways that reveal our very best—by speaking up on matters of consequence,
celebrating what is right and calling a wrong a wrong, listening carefully and
respectfully to others, and always keeping an open mind. Example matters.
In a speech in his hometown of Sacramento not long before he retired,
Justice Kennedy sounded a worry that the idea and promise of free speech
may be slipping from today’s generation. He worried that the cyber age,
despite all of its promise, was inhibiting quality dialogue; producing generations less educated in matters of history, literature, and philosophy; and rushing our interactions to such a degree that we are losing part of our ability to
reflect, learn, and grow.71
Allow me to conclude with an invitation. Let’s prove Justice Kennedy
both right and wrong. All around us—in our world, nation, and local communities—are enormous challenges craving creative, empathetic, and collaborative responses. Let each of us embrace the First Amendment’s promise
and become and remain fully engaged as individuals, friends and neighbors,
professors, parents, and citizens.
The questions are easy and obvious. It is the answers that require individual resolve and an embrace of our First Amendment freedom: Are we
going to use our voices to offer solutions; to press for change in rooms
replete with complacency; to clarify confusion and correct lies; to celebrate
right and to condemn wrong; to help your family, friends, and communities
69 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
71 See Justice Anthony Kennedy, Opening Remarks at a Conference on Civil Discourse
at the Sacramento Federal Courthouse (Sept. 15, 2017). For a video recording of the
speech, see Free Speech and How to Be Civil About It: Advice from SCOTUS Judge, KCRA3,
https://www.kcra.com/article/free-speech-and-how-to-be-civil-about-it-advice-from-scotusjudge-1/12258212 (last updated Sept. 16, 2017).
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move forward when faced with the hurt and losses life puts on our doorsteps;
to offer an optimistic perspective in a world where negativity often reigns
supreme; to offer essential nuance to viewpoints that prefer oversimplification; to bring understanding to circumstances blinded by intolerance; to
respect the dignity of individuals nobody else will defend; to add compassion
to a chorus line of condemnation; to sand off the sharp edge of a text message or Facebook post—in short, to make a positive difference in our own life
and the lives of others?
The First Amendment allows us to engage in our own ways and on our
own terms, but engage we must and urgently so, for too much is at stake for
us as individuals, our families and communities, and our nation and world.
As Justice Kennedy so simply, so rightly, and so eloquently stated in Hill v.
Colorado: “In a fleeting existence we have but little time to find truth through
discourse.”72
Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in the Symposium.

72 530 U.S. 703, 792 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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